Globality, Democracy and Civil Society by Terrell Carver & Jens Bartelson

Author:Terrell Carver & Jens Bartelson [Carver, Terrell & Bartelson, Jens]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, General, Civics & Citizenship, Political Ideologies, Democracy, Globalization
ISBN: 9781136888090
Google: c_vFBQAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 11121749
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2009-08-27T00:00:00+00:00

The problem with human rights

The point of departure for my reflections is that there is something very problematic about the idea of ‘human rights’ as it is usually envisaged, i.e. as a cultural invariant that should be accepted by all. This is due to the fact that, as it has often been pointed out, human rights are presented as being both universally valid and uniquely European in their origins. An important consequence of this formulation is that the universalisation of human rights is generally seen as depending on the adoption by other societies of Western types of institutions. Indeed most contemporary political theory – not to speak of Western politics – asserts that Western liberal democracy is the necessary framework for the implementation of human rights. Liberal democracy is presented as the ‘good regime’, the ‘just regime’, the only legitimate one. In fact a great deal of liberal democratic theory aims at proving that it is the kind of regime that would be chosen by rational individuals in idealised conditions ‘from behind the veil of ignorance’ (Rawls, 2005) or the ‘ideal speech situation’ (Habermas, 1984).

The dominant view, found in many different currents of political theory, asserts that moral progress requires the acceptance of the Western model of liberal democracy because it is the only possible shell for the implementation of human rights. It is interesting to note that such a view is found not only among the theorists who belong to the universalist-rationalist camp, but also in many others who argue for a contextualist approach. This, for instance, is the case with Rorty. Despite being an eloquent critique of Habermas’ brand of universalism, with its search for ‘context-independent’ arguments to justify the superiority of liberal democracy, Rorty comes very close to Habermas when it comes to the point of asserting this superiority.

To be sure, there are important differences between them. Habermas believes that the process of universalisation of liberal democracy will take place through rational argumentation and that it requires arguments from transculturally valid premises, while Rorty insists on making a distinction between ‘universal validity’ and ‘universal reach’. In his view, the universality of liberal democracy needs to be envisaged in this second mode, since it is not a matter of rationality but of persuasion and economic progress. According to Rorty, it is a question of people having more secure conditions of existence and sharing more beliefs and desires with others. He is adamant that, through economic growth and the right kind of ‘sentimental education’, it is possible to build a universal consensus around liberal democratic institutions. His disagreement with Habermas concerns the way to arrive at such a universal consensus, not its very possibility, and he never puts into question the superiority of the liberal way of life (Rorty, 1997, 1999).

Taking issue with both Habermas and Rorty, I want to challenge the idea that moral progress consists in the universalisation of Western liberal democracy with its specific understanding of human rights. I will argue in favour of a pluralist

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